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Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) forms a generally accepted concept to ensure 
sustainable development in the coastal zone. The implementation of the ICZM framework as 
formulated, e.g. by the World Coast Conference, is often constrained by the political system within 
which it should be applied. This is the case in the People’s Republic of China. This study takes a 
political science perspective based on approaches inherent in neo-institutional and administrative 
theories. This way the relevant political structures are explained and the impacts that the 
transformation of the socio-economic system had on institutions are located. This is extended by the 
reflection of related political power distribution. This part of the analysis mainly contains existing 
knowledge on (integrated) CZM in China but evaluates it from a so far neglected point of view.  The 
second part of the paper is taking the successful local ICZM approach of Xiamen and a proposed 
approach for Shanghai as an example to show that the adaptation of a working approach to other parts 
of the country is impossible without modifications to the organizational structures of decision-making 
and implementation. So far the literature emphasizes mostly modifications in content. An important 
reason for structural elements being comparably important is the choice of ICZM issues and the local 
power distribution. It furthermore shows that these are also the determining factors obstructing the 
upscaling of a local approach to the national level, a fact which constrains the formulation of national 
guidelines in China and leaves only the bottom-up alternative of introducing ICZM to China – a hard 
task that leaves a disproportional responsibility to the local governmental level.    2
Keywords: Integrated Coastal Zone Management, People’s Republic of China, Political Structure, 
Power Distribution, Jurisdictional Overlaps 
 
I) Introduction 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) aims to solve worldwide-perceived problems of the 
coastal zone. Especially population growth and urbanization trends pose a long-term threat to a 
sustainable development in the region. The People’s Republic of China (PRC, China hereafter) 
currently has a population of 1.3 billion, the world’s largest population of a country. Furthermore, for 
twenty years the country has experienced immense economic development [1]. Both, demographic 
and economic growth, are the strongest in the coastal provinces.   
 
The Chinese continental coastline consists of 18 000 km
1. Since economic reforms initiated by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1979 five Special Economic Zones (SEZ) were established along the coast. Some national 
surveys on the ocean’s resources and ways of profitable exploitation followed
2. The area still gains in 
economic importance. Furthermore the coastal zone represents the country’s most wealthy and 
socially diverse part of the country. The social classes range from the new superrich entrepreneurs to a 
newly formed middle class and to a growing group of poor peasants that are, among others, migrating 
to the coast in search of labour. Politically, parts of the coastal zone were the first to achieve 
substantial autonomy in economic matters and utilized political decentralization to follow local needs 
and interests. In this manner, some of the wealthiest areas, such as the Shanghai Municipality, gained 
a significant political influence over their area’s development [2]. 
As the development of the coastal zone progresses and the national and local interest in coastal and 
marine resources rise, the coastal zone needs to be managed sustainably. Apart from traditional and 
sectoral ways of managing the coastal zone, the literature generally introduces Coastal Zone 
Management as a planning and implementing programme. Since the early 1990s, however, the more 
advanced concept of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) has been discussed
3. It provides an 
approach to help preserve the natural ecosystem and at the same time develop economic growth. In 
contrast to the common sectoral way of managing the coastal zone, ICZM does not emphasize the 
                                                 
1 Adding the length of coast of around 6500 islands the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims sovereignty over, it even extends to 32 000 
km. Regarding the issue of definition of the coastal zone see II.2. 
2 A detailed account on national programs and surveys undertaken is following in III.2.a and d.  
3 This paper is largely oriented towards the CZM definition the World Coast Conference based their discussion and findings on [3]. See also 
section III.1.      3
needs of a single sector but takes a holistic view. This way even social and political conflicts that arise 
can be addressed. However, ICZM’s first task is to combine economic and ecological needs to 
guarantee sustainability. The problems addressed range from multi-use conflicts of different economic 
sectors – mostly regarding spatial and resource allocation – to the avoidance of man-made ecological 
disasters and the negative impacts of development projects, such as erosion, oil spills, salinisation of 
ground water and soil, or uncontrollable inundation of coastal areas.  
 
Indeed, the threat of sea-level rise due to global warming is a very important problem for such vast 
coastal areas as China’s. Scientists have paid attention to this development since the 1980s [4].   
Strikingly, the Chinese government has not explicitly addressed the problem as a task within ICZM.
4 
The issue is increasingly addressed by the media, though, and such the river deltas of China and 
especially the big cities located within them are acknowledged as the most threatened places by sea-
level rise [8]. Due to their smaller economic importance some other low-lying areas along the coast 
are not particularly mentioned to be in danger. However, global studies on the effects of sea-level rise 
predict significant impacts [9]. On a regional scale aspects such as land subsidence and crustal vertical 
movement are also determining factors [4]. Adaptation methods considered in China still emphasize 




ICZM has been built on a few general conditions to be met by countries using the concept. These 
presuppositions are a functioning legislative system, at best an independent coordinating agency and a 
high degree of public participation [10]
6. In the case of the PRC, hardly any of these formal aspects 
have been fully achieved
7. Nonetheless, the Chinese government decided to implement ICZM [5] [6] 
and made substantial progress during the last decade to meet these objectives, as far as China’s 
political system allows. The structural impacts a political system can have on the implementation of a 
concept are not necessarily negative. It is rather the sum of all impacts experienced through the 
organization and implementation of Coastal Zone Management (CZM) in a country or region 
conditioned by the general political organization and implementation of this country or region. 
                                                 
4 China is indeed planning to establish ICZM nationwide [5] [6]. And in fact sea-level rise is officially mentioned as a planning demand in 
the China Ocean Agenda [7], but not as a problem to be addressed within the ICZM concept. 
5 This study forms the basic part of a forthcoming study on socio-economic and decision-making aspects of adaptation methods to sea level 
rise in China. 
6 Other main elements widely perceived as vital within a CZM cycle are: a CZM plan, an applied research strategy as well as monitoring and 
evaluation systems. This paper focuses on elements seen as generally still hampering an adoption of CZM [10]. 
7 With China in the focus this paper concentrates on the constraints caused by the political system.   4
Furthermore decision-making processes that are determined by the organization of CZM affect 
implementation. These decision-making processes are reflected by institutional functions and 
responsibilities for certain tasks relating to CZM. This paper predominantly uses the self-definition of 
the institutions that have an organizational share in the management of the coastal zone. 
 
Concerning the usability of ICZM structures there are different levels of planning and implementation 
to be distinguished: global – national – local. Global approaches serve as formulating a set of 
guidelines for the least common denominator for all coastal countries. Such a catalogue of guidelines 
has been formulated by the World Coast Conference in 1993 [3]
8. The local level is understood as the 
most practical level, where global and national guidelines may be tried and fed back into the discourse 
on national and global levels [11]. Therefore China’s Agenda 21 suggests that “pilot areas will be 
selected to formulate the guidelines for integrated CZM” [12]. Essentially there are two major 
directions in which ICZM is continuously formulated and tested: from global to national (and to some 
extent local) level and from local to national and (to a certain extent) global level. These directions 
reflect the two perspectives of top-down and bottom-up approaches (compare [13] [14]). While it is 
not this paper’s intention to evaluate which of these approaches is more practical or consistent with 
ICZM theory, it takes the example of the PR China to show the impact that political, organizational 
structures have on these two ways of adopting a concept to a country’s or even a locality’s reality. 
Sceptics may question the role of the national level in this, when the theory seems to be mostly rooted 
in the global level and the local level is used to put theory into practice and so generate ‘lessons 
learned’. The national level is important as it conditions the status of a local program, is potentially 
involved in finance matters and is able to provide guidelines for a whole country, not only in terms of 
who is responsible on the national level, but also cutting short the process of local levels formulating 
numerous own approaches. The national level thus gathers the feedback derived from the local 
programs and projects them into a set of guidelines suitable for exactly this country. Nonetheless the 
bottom-up approach is not to be overestimated. Especially when broken down to county level, 
formulating own programs may be a task too responsible for lower level administrations. This paper 
will take both directions of adoption into account, top-down and bottom-up, and emphasize the 
organisational structure’s impacts on implementing ICZM in China. 
                                                 
8 Major guidelines had been developed before by UNEP, FAO and the World Bank [10]. The World Coast Conference in 1993 brought 
theorists and practitioners together on a worldwide scale in order to help coastal states to meet the coastal challenges of the 21
st century, 
including population growth and climate change.   5
 
This paper takes a theoretical political science approach. It analyses the existing coastal zone 
management system in the PRC and compares it to an integrated framework proposed by international 
organisations. The first part contains a literature review and addresses the methodology used. The 
following part applies basic definitions of the coastal zone to China and economic interests in the 
region are described. Then, the general ICZM approach is introduced and the ICZM attempts in China 
are discussed. A detailed analysis of the Chinese political system and its impacts on decision-making 
processes of CZM in China follows. Furthermore, the local ICZM approach of Xiamen is described 
and compared to both, the current CZM and a proposed ICZM approach of Shanghai. Finally, local 
ICZM structures are discussed regarding their applicability on the national level, i.e. their suitability to 
be used as national guidelines supporting local ICZM attempts. The paper provides a local structure 
that pays attention to the political organizational component involved. 
 
I.1) Literature review 
Most of the studies on coastal zone management either approach the issue from a general perspective 
or focus on case studies. Only few studies combine both aspects mostly with a strong emphasis on one 
of the parts. Furthermore, most studies that have been published are based on natural scientific 
research. In these publications management is understood as a means of activating sustainable 
development. Elements are agreed on and further assessment of them is subject to a technical 
approach of acknowledging the element’s existence and pinpointing its objective. The success of a 
management’s element is tied to a measured quantity, e.g. emission of pollutants
9. If it is considered a 
failure a change in elements is proposed. This understanding of management is neglecting the 
possibility that it may not be the element constraining success, but the way of implementation or 
perhaps other influencing aspects that are not within the management’s own system, e.g. a country’s 
political structure. This way, organizational and structural factors inherent in every management 
system are systematically underestimated. A possibility to integrate these can be found in political 
science
10, especially administrative politics
11 and institutional politics
12. The first group focuses on the 
                                                 
9 A recent study on evaluation of coastal zone sustainability using an indicator system has been produced by Shi et al. [15]. 
10 For methods and scope of political science please refer to Zuckerman [16] and Ball [17]. 
11 For further information on administrative politics please refer to Simon [18] and Knoke [19] (especially chapter 4 on organizational power 
p. 85-117). 
12 For further information on studies of institutional politics on China please refer to Lieberthal and Oksenberg [20], and Lieberthal and 
Lampton [21] with special recognition of contributions by Shirk (p. 59-91), Hamrin (p. 95-124) and Halpern (p. 125-148).  For general 
studies of institutional politics including neo-institutional approaches please refer to Papadakis [22], Lane and Ersson [23], Windhoff-  6
organization of a system and its agents, whereas the latter group emphasizes changes in structures, 
such as an institutional adaptation to changed conditions in political target. Even if a few publications 
on CZM mention the necessity of social and political science approaches in assessing management 
systems, so far this has not been done for general structures of coastal zone management in China.
13 
This paper aims at filling this gap.     
 
In the wake of the World Coast Conference (WCC 1993) the World Bank [27] published general 
guidelines for ICZM and recommendations on the development of ICZM programs. Such a focus is 
also taken by the WCC 1993 Conference Report [28], that additionally aims at a common 
methodology and therefore compares a number of local and regional studies on vulnerability 
assessment and coastal zone management. One China country study and three local or regional studies 
were used in this comparison. The publication of the WCC 1993 proceedings [3] also contains 
Winsemius’ [29] general study on CZM development stages. 
  
Many authors dedicated their studies to the CZM issue and produced a wide range of perspectives. 
French [30] gives an important account on the coastal zone’s definition and further emphasises the 
issue of coastline protection. Hinrichsen [13] [14] takes a view on the impact the growth of population 
has on the development of the costal zone and problems generated. In a section about ICZM in China 
he also takes economic, ecological and management aspects into account and explains the problem of 
pollution in the Bohai and Huanghai seas. He uses examples from different regions of the world to 
discuss CZM and the lessons learned during the last twenty years. He recommends a two-level 
approach for initially implementing ICZM in a country: top-down and bottom-up, a view that can be 
applied to China very well. Vallega [31] gives a very detailed account on ICZM methodology 
covering aspects from coastal zone definition to management issues. He often uses the Mediterranean 
as a case.  
As the World Bank also the United Nations Economic and Social Commission on Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP) [32] contributed to the issue of ICZM with an extensive introduction to general ICZM 
guidelines and an overview to Asian approaches. The case of China is introduced by a description of 
                                                                                                                                                          
Héritier [24] with special recognition of contributions by Windhoff-Héritier (p. 27-52) and Olsen (p. 87-119). Further reading into Chinese 
issues is provided by Hamrin and Zhao [25].  
13 An exception and recent example for a study considering a single political factor, i.e. public participation, is McCleave et al. [26]. The 
authors compare two examples for decentralized ICZM: a local government run progam (Xiamen) and a community-based program (Atlantic 
Coastal Action Program, Canada).   7
the location and conditions of the Chinese coastal zone, an identification of major problems occurring 
there, and facts on national surveys, institutional arrangements and legislation. Furthermore a focus is 
put on Hainan province, described as a model case of ocean management. The UNESCAP [33] also 
published information on marine resources as a special point of interest and on management issues 
such as stakeholder participation, marine zoning, China’s national CZM strategy and international co-
operation in the field.  
 
Zhang [34] as part of the WCC 1993 conference publication also starts from the perspective of coastal 
resource allocation and an identification of industries involved. Additional topics are the major 
impacts of industrial activity on the ecosystem, e.g. erosion and pollution are included. Management 
issues are extensively addressed and also studies on sea-level rise are mentioned.  
Two publications by Wang [35] [36] give extensive overviews of location and conditions of the 
coastal zone in China and criticise the lack of a consistent boundary of the zone during the 1990s and 
the lack of management integration. The latter aspect is also specifically taken up by Dong [37] who 
otherwise gives a similarly informative account of the Chinese coastal zone and issues of importance.  
 
There are only very few publications, that introduce local management approaches in detail. In the 
Anglophone literature only studies on the ICZM demonstration project in Xiamen [11] [26] [38] [39] 
and Shanghai [40] can be found. McCleave et al. [26] compares the successful Xiamen approach to a 
local attempt in Canada and emphasises the aspect of decentralization especially for stakeholder 
participation. GEF et al. [38] [39] are project reports on the Xiamen site and Chua et al. [11] takes up 
the issue of lessons learned there. Shi et al. [40] introduces a proposed ICZM concept for Shanghai.  
 
Concluding from the existing literature CZM in China is either discussed as a part of general 
introductions of ICZM and such the impression is left, that it is gradually adopting the general concept. 
Or, in contrast, China’s ICZM is discussed by authors taking the conditions of China’s coastal zone as 
a starting point and include a critical perspective on current implementation. However, none of the 
publications reviewed takes a political perspective and/or shows the systematic implications coastal 
zone management is subject to. This paper aims at contributing to the issue by providing such a 
political perspective and pinpointing the organizational and structural problems coastal zone 
management in China faces today. In order to show why the country’s political system is indeed a   8
critical feature for the applicability of a general ICZM concept, the current CZM situation in China is 
discussed. It shows that the political system in China has significant impact on the adoption of general 
concepts. This study gives account of ICZM in China and addresses relevant institutional and 
organizational changes since the last administrative reform in 1998. It further turns out, that the 
adoption of concepts on the national level is already problematic: this seems to exclude top-down 
approaches from global to national level. As Xiamen’s local ICZM approach is exceptionally 
successful within the Asian region prominent features of its local political organization in ICZM are 
highlighted and the possibility to adopt such a local concept to other regions (Shanghai) is discussed. 
Furthermore it is assessed whether it could serve - bottom-up - as a national concept for China. 
 
I.2) Methodology 
This paper takes a political science approach to investigate current CZM structures in China. The 
focus is on decision-making processes and possible impacts of political and cultural aspects as well as 
power distribution. The Chinese administrative system in itself is rather complex and continuously 
changing under the latest reform efforts. The objective to clarify jurisdiction and alternative decision-
making within the set-up is a major challenge. In order to understand the basic conditions, institutional 
organization and agencies’ responsibilities are mapped.  
 
Additionally to the fact that the Chinese administrative system is comparably complex, unbureaucratic 
contact to governmental representatives in China is still the exception. Therefore verification of 
information takes up a major part of research time. Another constraint is that many study and paper 
proposals can be found on the web, unfortunately without contact details. Sometimes it is difficult to 
reconstruct whether these were ever put into action or not.
  
 
This paper is based on a series of open interviews with academics at Shanghai Universities, the 
Shanghai branch of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and participants of a workshop in 
Xiamen
14. The other main source of information is a review of governmental documents, such as law 
texts, white papers and ministry programmes, and other official publications (e.g. newspaper articles, 
information brochures and website presentations). A large part of these sources are accessible in 
Chinese only. In case of bi-lingual publications, the Chinese version was used for verification. 
                                                 
14 This workshop ‘Sharing Lessons Learned in Sustainable Coastal Development’ was organized by the GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional 
Programme on Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), 20-23 September 2002 Xiamen, PRC.   9
 
This study does not take a single case as an example, as Buen [41] does, but aims to generally 
illustrate CZM conditions in China with regard to their relation to political structures and the impact 
these structures may have on CZM decision-making. Due to very limited access to official 
information on practical outcomes of local ICZM in China this study is theory-driven and focuses on 
the analysis of political structures. For this purpose the existing CZM structures in China are 
investigated using institutional and administrative approaches of political science. In order to 
understand the political and organisational power distribution the underlying organisational structures 
in the Chinese political system as well as their transformation are explained. While this part of the 
analysis is mainly using readily available facts and information on (I)CZM in China the second part of 
this study produces a novel view on CZM structures including an assessment of specific power 
distribution in exemplary (I)CZM approaches. The successful ICZM approach of Xiamen and a 
proposed approach for Shanghai are taken as examples to show the necessity of modifications to the 
organisational structures in order to make a straightforward adoption of an ICZM program possible. 
While emphasising structural and organisational elements of ICZM it becomes clear that these are 
among other elements, i.e. implementation and content related aspects, responsible for success or 
failure of ICZM approaches in diverse localities. Finally, an organisational structure of ICZM is 
suggested that reduces constraints by structural elements. This way it becomes clear that the widely 
accepted assumption that an approach is generally not adoptable to other localities than the one it is 
tailored to should be based on more than modifications in content of an ICZM program.   
 
II) The Chinese Coast 
The necessity of introducing coastal zone management in China becomes clear through taking a 
comprehensive view of the Chinese coastal zone. To get a clear picture though is problematic. The 
definitions regarding the area are as diverse as the fields of science they have their seeds in.  
 
The following section takes up the major groups of biological and geophysical, geo- and demographic 
as well as economic information, which in combination are able to shed light on the conditions found 
in the coastal zone and on the potential problems that occur, e.g. through a high percentage of 
population, strong economic development and in some parts a fragile eco-system. Furthermore this 
section states the definitions of population and coastal length used in this paper.   10
 
II.1) Biological and geophysical conditions 
The Chinese coast stretches across three climate zones: the temperate, sub-tropical and tropical zones. 
It therefore holds a huge variety of species in a number of different ecosystems. These range in the 
coastal zone from tidal flatlands to river-delta ecosystems, include marine natural systems, and even 
encompass mangroves and coral reefs. Morphologically, the coast varies from bedrock to sandy 
beaches; some parts are subject to significant erosion.
15   
 
II.2) Geo- and demographic conditions 
A comprehensive and up-to-date estimation of the economic importance and of population data for the 
coastal region is difficult, as there are many contradicting data and diverse definitions for the ‘coastal 
zone’ in the literature.
16  
The official Chinese account [44] gives a coastline length of 18 000 km of mainland coast plus 14 000 
km of shore length for coastal islands.
17 The estimated number of islands taken into account differs 
from 5000 to 6500.
18 In the following this paper refers to a mainland coastline of 18 000 km relying 
on the exactness of data derived from Chinese coastal surveys undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s. It 
must, however, be understood that some important areas of the Chinese coast (e.g. Hainan and 
Chongming/Shanghai) are islands not included in this number.   
 
The definition of the coastal zone differs between studies. Early accounts apparently use the 
administrative delimitation of provinces for the inland direction [34]. Wang [35] writes that the 
coastal zone would encompass the area from 10 km landwards from the seashore and 15-20 m 
bathymetric contours seawards. The SOA Shanghai branch defines it as the area 5-10 km landwards 
and 20 m isobath.
19 In contrast, LOICZ [48] uses elevation grids in order to define the coastal zone.
20   
                                                 
15 Information on geophysical conditions can be drawn from Zhao [42] and Ren [43]. 
16 There are either data given without proper definition on the region it is applied to, or definitions from different fields of science exist for 
the area but are not further filled in with numbers. Among others the World Bank [27] has stressed the importance of a sound definition of 
the area to be managed by ICZM. 
17 The CIA world factbook [45] claims to include islands with citing a total coastal length of 14 500 km. The World Resources Institute 
(WRI) [46] states a coastline of 30 017 km length including non-overseas islands. 
18 The official white paper on the Development of China’s Marine Programs [47] gives a number of 5000 islands with an area of more than 
500 km², the official Chinese news agency [44] – Xinhuanet -  states a number of 5400 islands with a total area of 38.700 km²  whereas 
Wang [35] [36] gives an overall number of 6500 islands. Official government data presumably include the Republic of China (ROC) on the 
island of Taiwan. 
19 Information was gathered during a personal interview on the 18 September 2002 with Yang Kailiang, director of the Shanghai Marine 
Department, Integrative Section. 
20 When the LOICZ project was established it used a 50 m elevation to 50 m depth grid. This was later adapted to a more generally used 
spatial resolution of 1x1 degree.    11
Wang [36] further states that China has a total land area on the coast of 350 000 km², whereas 
Xinhuanet [49] states a coastal area of 280 000 km² of which 20 800 km² are considered ‘sea beach’ 
area. Apparently the well-known problem of numbers given without exact definitions of the region 
applied to is responsible for such diverse accounts. 
 
Other definitions emphasize the water – or marine – part of the coast and focus on the differences 
between China’s territorial waters (12 nautical miles from the low-tide line), its contiguous zone (24 
nm from the low-tide line), and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nm from the coast (as 
defined by UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea - in 1982) [50].
21 
Strikingly, although the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) is the agency in charge of CZM in China 
and defines the Coastal Zone as 5-10 km inland and 20 m isobath, with regard to its functions, it refers 
more to the marine zone and much less to the adjacent coastal area [51]
22. Thus the difference between 
coastal zone and marine zone defines a major contradiction in China’s CZM approach.  
 
Similar to a consistent definition of the coastal zone another definition problem occurs for population 
numbers within the area. Citing Wang [36] the coastal zone would enclose 41% of China’s population.
 
The World Resources Institute (WRI) [46] comes up with 24% of the population living in a 100 km 
belt of the coast, referring to population estimates of 1995.
23  
Population numbers for the coastal zone can also be derived along administrative borders. In this case 
the total province population is taken. When using this method more than 50% of China’s total 
population live in coastal provinces.
24  This paper assumes that for 1990 data less than 5% of the total 
Chinese population live in the coastal zone as defined by the SOA (up to 10 km inland). Furthermore 
only 22% live in the 100 km zone.
25  
 
                                                 
21 The contiguous zone is enabling a country to protect the rights of its territorial waters, e.g. for customs. The EEZ is the zone in which a 
country is allowed to exploit all natural resources.  
Compare Vallega [31, p. 78-92] on the definition of the normal baseline as depending on the low tide and the creation of straight baselines; 
further quite detailed on jurisdiction in the various zones. Compare also Awosika et al. [10, p. 111].  
22 Some official documents see the marine area as extension of the coastal area with a strong emphasis on exploitation and in part protection 
[7, p. 25.]. Nonetheless in content these documents almost exclusively address marine issues [47].  
23 The WRI uses GIS and a dataset distribution of population along administrative units and percentage calculation from UN population 
division totals from 1995.  
24 Compare Hinrichsen [13] and own estimations on the basis of population data from 2000. The number of total population is stated with 
1,295 billion for the census of 2000 [52].   
25 These are results from own calculations with freely available county population data from the 1990 census [53] and a GIS-supported 
delimitation of the coastal zone into four belts reflecting the 10 km, 20 km, 50 km and 100 km line respectively. It shows that the WRI 
estimations are nearest to own results. The fact that they are still higher can be explained by them using 1995 population data. In respect to 
all other estimations it shows that a calculation based on smaller administrative units is much more precise.     12
Nicholls and Small [54] state that although ”the term coastal population is widely used, a single 
consistent definition […] does not seem to exist”. They use a 100 m (of the sea-level)/ 100 km (of the 
shoreline) grid and come to the conclusion that “most of the near-shore population does not live in 
large cities”.
26 Despite this, Hinrichsen [13] found, that “the greatest increases in population in most 
regions have been registered in urban areas along the coastline”. He adds that mostly this is a result of 
extended migration from the countryside, rather than natural growth. Whereas the latter argument is 
true for China
27 reliable urban population numbers are difficult to estimate. A reason is the unique 
definition of rural/urban population in official Chinese statistics. This way the complex administrative 
system restricts the scientific use of such numbers.
28  
 
II.3) Economic interests and economic reforms 
According to Wang [35] the coastal zone accounts for over 66% of the national GDP. Apart from that 
the Chinese government expects outstanding development regarding the so-called marine economy. 
This branch encompasses every ocean related source of income: from the primary kind like fishery, 
aquaculture, and marine mineral resources (offshore oil and gas resources as well as minerals in the 
ground) to secondary kinds such as tourism, coastal shipbuilding, and maritime transport even to more 
traditional kinds such as sea salt production and marine medicine. Recently, the branch has been 
subject to particular support from the government, starting with China’s Ocean Agenda [7] in 1996, 
followed by the White Paper on the Development of China’s Marine Program
29 [47] in 1998
30 and 
culminating in the fact that marine development became an important part of the Ninth Five-year-plan 
(1996-2000) [56].  
According to official accounts the marine industry had a total output of 350 billion Yuan (RMB) in 
1999 [57]. For China an attempted increase of the marine industry’s share of the GDP to up to 5% 
until 2010 is also accompanied by strengthened food security in the near future [58].  However, 
regionally the marine industries’ importance differs. Most successful are Guangdong, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Fujian, Zhejiang and Liaoning [59].  
                                                 
26 Wang [36] states that 70% of the country’s urban areas are situated in the coastal zone.  
27 In the PRC an estimate of 100 million so-called floating population exists with the majority moving towards the coast [55]. 
28 Generally, Chinese official statistics divide the total population per region into two different classifications: rural/urban and 
agricultural/non-agricultural. Both classifications are based on the national hukou-system, the Chinese household (or residence) registration 
system. For further information see http://csde.washington.edu/pubs/wps/98-13.pdf, www.prc.utexas.edu/workingpapers/98-99-06.pdf,  
www.iiasa.ac.at, www.china-labour.org.hk, and www.nus.edu.sg.  
29 White papers are domestically a planning tool for specific topics - and often cover a longer time span than the usual 5 years, in this case a 
period until 2010. Internationally they are a means of propaganda, so the government will dedicate a white paper to every potentially 
disputed issue, e.g. the Chinese Tibet policy, clarifying its intentions. It must be understood though, that positive results of preceding efforts 
will dominate the contents.  
30 1998 was the world ocean year.   13
 
What made the coastal region so wealthy? The reason was targeted economic and administrative 
reforms
31. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership the CCP realized the need for economic development in 
order to politically and socially stabilize the country. The decision to open China to the world – 
sometimes referred to as the ‘open-door policy’ [60] - was taken in 1978 and was formally initiated 
during the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CCP one year later. Main objective was to 
restructure the economy from the strictly centrally planned soviet-oriented model towards a more 
market-oriented system. Parallel to this the administrative reform was coupled to a decentralization of 
major power structures, serving the purpose of encouraging economic self-reliance in the regions.  
 
Encouragement of foreign investment formed a main task of the economic reform. In order to 
generate this, since 1980 the central government founded five Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
(compare figure 1).
32 In 1984 followed the designation of 14 Open Coastal Cities, whose “policy was 
explicitly formulated to favour investors from overseas and the territories of Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan over domestic interests” [61, p.309]. After the crackdown of the ‘Pro-democracy 
demonstrations’
33 and the following economic sanctions against China, the Chinese government took 
further measures of its open policy to signal persisting favourable climate for foreign investments. In 
1992 it began to establish Free Trade Zones, Economic and Technological Development Zones as 
well as New and High-tech Industrial Development Zones, which were mainly located in the Coastal 
Open Cities or SEZs [62] [63] [64].
  Meanwhile seven economic regions within the coastal belt have 
emerged
34 (compare figure 1).   
 
Taking into account the status the coastal zone takes with regards to economic power its importance 
for the whole country’s development becomes apparent. For China’s future development it is vital to 
embed economic and demographic growth into a sustainable strategy. This includes the aspect of 
environmental protection as well as planned and controlled economic growth. Sustainable 
development is also the major objective of Integrated Coastal Zone Management – a general approach 
                                                 
31 These were initiated after the destructive experience of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) which had left the Chinese nation in a state of 
economical, organizational as well as social vacuum. The death of Mao Zedong, founder of the PRC, eventually cleared the path for the 
return of Deng Xiaoping. 
32 These SEZs were: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen and Shantou
 as well as Hainan, which was later in 1988 upgraded to provincial level. 
33 This is the so-called Tiananmen-incident on the 4. June 1989. 
34 The Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai and parts of Jiangsu and Zhejiang), the Pearl River Delta (also called the Guangdong Province SEZ, 
including Guangzhou, Zhuhai, Shenzhen, Macao SAR and Hong Kong SAR), the Xiamen-Quanzhou-Zhangzhou-Triangle (also called 
Fujian Province SEZ), the Shandong Peninsula, the Liaodong Peninsula (Liaoning province), Hebei (including Tianjin) and Guangxi 
(especially the Open Coastal City of Beihai).   14
to mitigate the problems of the global coastal zone. Generalization usually aims at a high possibility 
that a country can adopt the concept, with only minor modifications. In the case of China this will 
hardly be the case. Political and cultural realities prevent a mere adoption of the ICZM concept. In the 
following the general idea of ICZM will be introduced along with the Chinese interpretation.   
 
III) Integrated Coastal Zone Management 
III.1) ICZM – general assumptions 
In terms of different perspectives taken towards the issue of CZM, the literature is quite complex. 
Some focus on the requirements to be met and instruments to be used, others study the contents of the 
different programmes and aim at a possible generalization.  
Unfortunately the literature is not always clear in distinguishing between CZM and ICZM. In the early 
stage of discussing the coastal zone from management perspective – until the WCC 1993 and thus 
including the direct output of the conference – ICZM was not defined as an independent concept, but 
was only seen as reduced to the operational level of CZM. This paper is in contrast making a 
difference between CZM and ICZM as conceptual approaches with the former following a unified 
goal (defined by the coastal zone management plan) but not necessarily a compatible organizational 
structure and the latter emphasizing this organizational structure in order to enable the set of goals 
(within the CZM plan) to (re-)define the sectoral entities. Therefore both – CZM and ICZM – are 
understood as contrary to the most basic sectoral organization - that is without an overall goal - of 
issues and interests located in the coastal zone. Sectoral coastal zone management has it that every 
stakeholder and ministerial agency involved in the coastal zone – even rather marginally involved 
ones, e.g. the telecommunication sector – is responsible for their share of coastal related issues. This is 
also the case with CZM with the difference that in CZM the sectors have a unified approach already, 
e.g. following the concept of sustainable development. As some issues within the coastal zone are 
subject to many-fold interests, both of these set-ups potentially include the problems of overlapping 
responsibilities and inadequate response opportunities, e.g. to disasters or unexpected events. The 
number of involved agents alone often generates these problems. In contrast, the idea of ICZM aims at 
a clear distribution of responsibilities of involved agencies and thus an equally clear coordination of 
all activities taking place in the coastal zone. Through this coordination it should become possible to 
more efficiently follow a sustainable way in developing the coastal zone as well as become able to 
respond to problems in a manner avoiding retarding conflicts. Such an approach can be strengthened   15
by a legislation especially formulated for the coastal zone and embedded in a working legislative 
system. Furthermore the legislation can at best assure that an ICZM program can be implemented and 
every sector’s stakes are sufficiently included. In order to find a common line of action in 
implementing the ICZM concept in 1993 the World Coast Conference (WCC 1993) [3] brought 
numerous scientists and responsible politicians of more than 90 nations, 20 international and 23 non-
governmental organizations together.   
 
Despite formulating their common recommendation to implement ICZM it is still disputed, in which 
stage integrated CZM begins. Is it enough to formulate a CZM program or is the existence of a CZM 
plan a necessary precondition?
35 Similarly, is it enough to name an implementing agency and generate 
the establishment of sub-divisions down to local governmental level, or are stakeholder and public 
participation a vital aspect of successful CZM?   
 
It soon becomes clear, that due to its political system, China has a basic problem with a proper ICZM 
implementation, as suggested by the WCC 1993. In this context, for China, recommendations instead 
of binding guidelines are advantageous. However, it is also a problem to clearly place China into a 
certain stage of CZM. Therefore, on this basis, it is hardly assessable whether CZM in China is of the 
integrated kind and functioning or not. The development stages of CZM (figure 2) have been 
extensively explained by Winsemius [29].
36  As long as no CZM program is implemented, the 
government is restricted to reactive policy. This includes every uncoordinated action taking place as 
soon as, e.g. an oil spill disaster happens.
37 The moment CZM is pursued the CZM policy makers are 
striving for internal integration, which means “aligning all government units with a direct coastal zone 
responsibility at a national, regional, or local level” [29, p. 417]. Winsemius already includes sectoral 
agencies into this stage and leaves the integration of affiliated public sectors (bound to get orders from 
the CZM policy makers) and private economic stakeholders to the next stage. Regarding the situation 
in China, the most important aspect is that the governmental and private responsibilities within the 
different economic sectors can hardly be distinguished. That is one reason to interpret this stage here 
                                                 
35 For the issue of CZM plans and programs in connection with a country’s legislation, see III.2.a. 
36 In the following I interpret his approach, but changed terminology from sectoral to administrative level integration and from topical to 
sectoral level integration. In order to create a consistent terminology throughout the paper, I intended to harmonize the general structural 
explanations with the Chinese political and administrative set-up. I believe to stay in consensus with Winsemius’ intention. Errors are 
entirely my responsibility. 
37 In the case of oil spills, this seems to be the reality, regardless if CZM is pursued or not. The environmental pollutions caused by the 
Exxon Valdez, or more recently the sinking of the Prestige close to the North Spanish coast are good examples.   16




The following stage is achieved through external integration of the so-called linking groups. As 
already mentioned, this stage is aiming at an integration of “other government departments (industry, 
transportation, housing, urbanization, education, and tourism) each with its own sector-specific goals” 
and a close interaction with their target groups - private enterprises or entities [29, p. 417].
  To some 
extent this illustrates classical stakeholder participation, which in China is represented by the various 
coastal zone related sectors. The final stage of CZM development is the internalisation of the target 
groups that leads to a fully comprehensive policy. In both cases - Winsemius’ perspective and the 
application to China - target groups encompass all affected groups and public participation is achieved. 
 
Winsemius further emphasizes that these target groups should identify themselves with the objectives 
of CZM. Again, for the situation in China, interpretation is more detailed. For example identification 




a) Issues and their conceptual frames 
In the following a short overview of general CZM issues and conceptual frames is given.
40 
Furthermore the variety of issues is reflected and it is shown that a distinction is possible by problem 
and practice oriented approaches. 
Vallega [31, p. 148] illustrates that the problems that are to be solved influence the way the coastal 
zone is perceived, and therefore the tasks considered most important, are different from programme to 
programme. Thus, for example, the Lingayen Gulf Coastal Area Management Plan from 1992 
emphasises fisheries and aquaculture in search for alternatives and to “achieve sustainable 
development of biological resources vis-à-vis the increasing human pressure on the coastal area”.  
In contrast, the UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) approach from 1995 is more 
generally considering the unique characteristics of coastal areas being subject to, among others, 
                                                 
38 Another reason is that a major (upcoming) point of critical comment is the lack of clear jurisdiction for CZM related agencies in the 
sectoral government. So, if I would apply the original CZM development stages structure by Winsemius to the PRC, China would not even 
have been arrived at this stage. However, such an evaluation would hardly be fair, taking the efforts the Chinese government is undertaking 
and the unique political situation of the country into account. 
39 See also section III.2.b. 
40 The issues and concepts of China’s CZM are being discussed later in section V.   17
“economically diversified regional organisation” [31, p.148], e.g. agricultural land, forestry, mining, 
industrial use, and so on.  
Whereas the first example is a locally and problem-oriented approach, putting sustainable 
development in the centre of interest, the second example aims at a universal approach and focuses 
already on a way of generally categorizing the various parts of the coastal zone.
41 
 
Similar to the number of approaches, the topics of CZM are also quite numerous. They can be 
organized into the following categories:  
-- Environmental protection 
-- Multi-use conflicts 
-- Resource allocation  
-- Disaster prevention 
The overall objective is always a sustainable coastal development.  
 
The concept of sustainability entered the political agenda only quite recently, in the late 1980s, and is 
widely understood as the “foundation of Agenda 21 and of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development” 
 [65, p.1]. Despite its origin in different fields of science, the environmental, social and 
economic components’ interaction is the core point of interest.   
 
The concept of sustainability is supported by a truly holistic perspective. Only if the coastal zone is 
seen as one picture, sustainability is possible [30].
  This emphasizes ICZM strategies, “that take 
account of population growth and distribution, urbanization trends, consumption patterns, generation 
of wastes and the use (and abuse) of available resources” 
 [13]. In a way the concept of sustainability 
strengthens the interdisciplinary character of ICZM whereas the specifically holistic viewpoint 
emphasizes the practical details of the concept.  
 
b) Tools 
To integrate every possible problem and development into a concept is a difficulty. Therefore it is 
recommended to launch testing or demonstration projects for evaluation of strategies and technologies 
[10]. This evaluation can be regarding issue or implementation factors likewise.  The latter aspect of 
                                                 
41 This is already indicating the implementation tool of functional zoning to be discussed in III.1.b.   18
planning and implementation tools is most important and holds a great variety [10]. In this section the 
Chinese view should be emphasized.  
  
For the Chinese CZM approach functional zoning was defined as a major tool [66] [67] [68]. It 
divides the coastal zone into units of different use. If more than one use is applied to a unit, the 
activities need to be compatible [27, p. 708]. 
   
 
The emphasis of the functional zoning can differ, either regarding its various uses (economic focus) or 
along its environmental value (ecological focus)
42 [10, p.110f, 122].  The former takes as a fact, that a 
use will be applied therefore it can be regarded more as a tool of preventing e.g. multi-use conflicts, 
and at the same time always being dedicated to the objective of sustainable development. In contrast, 
the latter indicates which sort of use, if any, may be applied.
43 In this case the environmental aspect 
seems to be more important. The Chinese programme takes the latter approach, while categorizing at 
least the marine part of the coastal zone into zones ranging from no use to extended use.
44 Nonetheless 
this ecologically focussed attempt at zonation is by far a guarantee in favour of environmental 
interests and in opposition to economic planning.   
 
The determining aspect is, who makes the decisions about the way to categorize and who undertakes 
the categorization and is responsible for its implementation. This is subject of the organization of 
CZM. In the following the general requirements of CZM and their reality in China are discussed. 
 
III.2) Formal CZM requirements and the situation in China  
General CZM aspects that are considered as continuing obstacles in ICZM implementation [10] are 
related to a functioning legislation, the implementing agency and public participation.
 This paper is 
emphasising these elements as requirements, because they are also closely related to the political 
system. They reflect what the government is prepared to allow and what factors are depending on 
organizational structures. Additionally to this, the CZM process is often explicitly said to be a 
framework in flux, and therefore the mentioned requirements are not necessarily set in all 
                                                 
42 A basis for this are attempts to categorize the coastal resources and identify possible CZM issues.  
43 In the case of no use, total natural protection is achieved. 
44 China’s sea is divided into five kinds of zones: (1) utilization and development, (2) treatment and protection, (3) nature reserves, (4) 
special functions, and (5) reserved zones. Citing Li (1991) after UNESCAP [31, p.38]. The program on functional zoning was undertaken 
1989-1992 [34], respectively 1989-1995 [69]. Wang [36] provides a similar division. On latest development of sea area use see Wang [66].   19
development stages. The program should remain able to react to conditional changes, such as new 
coastal uses or CZM goals or even a basic change in political conditions.
 [27, p.708]  
 
a) Legislation 
The legislation is mainly covered by a so-called CZM plan or act. Usually a management plan is the 
planning tool and should be preceding a management program, which is already part of the 
implementing procedure [10, p.120].
45  Following this argumentation, China’s Ocean Agenda 21 
(1996) [7] and its Marine Development Program (1998) [47] could count as a management framework. 
Apart from that, the contents of these documents emphasize general CZM topics and only very 
superficially provide guidelines for future management. Generally, a CZM act or plan should have a 
constitutional function for the coastal zone meaning that a leading agency is clearly appointed and the 
jurisdictions of all participating organs are defined (either directly or by existing legislation).
46 This is 
not the case with the above-mentioned Chinese documents. 
 
A CZM plan is supported by any law or regulation regarding the coastal zone. For China these are, for 
example, the Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1992) [71] and the Law 
of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of the PRC (1998) [72].  The Law of the PRC 
on the Use and Management of Sea Areas (2001)
 [73] holds a special importance as it is the only law 
explicitly relating the management of newly defined areas to certain activities undertaken there.
47 It 
also regulates the jurisdiction over marine zoning between the State Oceanic Administration, the 
Fishery Department and the Maritime Safety Administration.
48  Furthermore, there are amended 
versions of laws that deal with the coastal zone or coastal related sectors, e.g. the Fisheries Law from 
1986 [74] (amended 2002) and the Marine Environmental Protection Law from 1982 [75] (amended 
1999 [76]). For China, a coastal zone management act was proclaimed until 2000.
49 But it seems that 
                                                 
45 Again, the interpretations are diverse. Whereas Awosika et al. [10 p.107] do not at all connect the CZM plan to the legislation of a country, 
French [30, p. 204] criticises CZM plans to be too much of a decree. He addresses the problem of a top-down applied plan as generating 
users opposition, while they reject to become dictated what they should do. We should keep in mind, however, that in China this is not the 
main constraint in implementing CZM. 
46 This is for example the case in the State of Victoria, Australia [70]. Apparently in China also a local level CZM plan exists for Jiangsu 
province. Unfortunately it was not accessible to me within in time of writing. Nonetheless there is no Chinese CZM act for the national level 
taking the aspect of jurisdiction into account. 
47 Other related laws are regulations regarding navigation and safety of construction in navigable waters, international marine transport, 
prevention on pollution, exploitation of offshore oil and so on. 
48 Other agencies or tasks of the SOA are not concerned. The following analysis on the jurisdiction overlap is based on the self-description of 
all agencies involved. 
49 These efforts are being pursued since the early 1990s. Compare UNESCAP [32, p.38].   20
it is going to take until 2005 or even 2007 to achieve an overall CZM legislation.
50 Therefore, the 
legislation of CZM in China can be considered as preparatory.  
 
b) Public participation 
The considerations that general CZM approaches take in this regard have already been mentioned in 
the context of CZM development stages. Altogether, in democratic countries and international 
accounts, stakeholder participation as well as public participation is considered to be of high 
importance. These features get even explicitly mentioned in the formulation recommendations for 
CZM plans, requiring a plan of their own [27, p.711].
  
 
Apart from distinguishing into stakeholder and public participation, the issue can be addressed by 
participation mechanisms. These are many-fold and range from public hearings, to surveys on 
opinions and perceptions of potentially concerned groups up to the integration of stakeholder groups 
into the decision-making process itself. The decision whether and, to a certain degree, how to 
implement ICZM in an area could be expressed most obvious by a plebiscite, in which the public 
votes pro or contra. But the public may also be more actively involved in the solution creation by 
participation in round tables, and for instance workshops. If compared to each other an involvement of 
stakeholders is generally easier than the participation of the general public, but it should be kept in 
mind that the affected public is also to be considered a group of stakeholders, even if a usually 
unorganised group. In contrast the typical stakeholder is organised more often in, for instance, sectoral 
associations, comparative to employees represented by unions.  
 
Despite all these theoretical possibilities of participation, only few of them are generally put into 
action, but it shows that there is indeed a huge range of participation methods available, that mainly 
differ in their force. However, political realities may prevent some of the above-mentioned 
participatory methods. In this case participation may become defined accordingly. 
 
In China, public participation concentrates on awareness raising and educational activities. These are 
clearly basic objectives also included in general definition. Furthermore it is a challenging aspect to 
raise awareness in a population that for decades was made to believe that environmental problems 
                                                 
50 Information gathered during a personal interview on the 18 September 2002 with Yang Kailiang, director of the Shanghai Marine 
Department, Integrative Section.   21
were a feature of the Western world [77]. But educational programmes already encompass all school 
levels and higher learning institutions as well as holiday activities for children and of course special 
training courses for administrators active in the field [78]. It should be mentioned, though, that some 
of the special activities, such as the summer university in Xiamen, are being generated by the local 
level administration and are not part of a national plan.  
 
Stakeholder participation is by definition understood quite similar to the Western notion. One 
difference lies in the focus on larger businesses, which become involved and are sometimes even a 
part of political-economic networking. Politicians are often openly entangled in business matters. This 
in return means that the small entrepreneurs, such as single fishermen, are not explicitly considered 
important stakeholders. Although, officially they would have their share of influence as well, in reality 
even the unions in China are no organizations independent of the government [1, p. 210-211].   
Another difference is that Chinese stakeholders are generally only being informed by the relevant 
agency about CZM measures, but not actively included in the decision-making process [26].  
 
c) CZM agency 
Another general requirement closely related to the political system of a country focuses on the 
implementing CZM agency. Usually it is emphasized that this agency can either be newly established 
and thus bundle various economic sector objectives under one CZM umbrella; such a solution is often 
referred to as an independent commission. Or, on the other hand, the responsible agency already exists 
and is allocated additional jurisdiction. Another possibility is the new formation of such an agency 
within an established and powerful ministry. All of these proposed kinds of organization emphasize 
the need for highest political status and clearly defined leadership [27] [79] [26] [10]. Due to a lack in 
consistent presentation in the literature
51  the following section gives major information on the 
organization of the coastal agency in China and puts it together with relevant administrative 
conditions found. This way the basic framework for the institutional analysis is delineated.
52  
 
                                                 
51 Interestingly information within the anglophile literature tends to be lacking either detail or consistency, especially if compared to the 
information in Chinese language. In parts inaccurate translation of terms adds to the confusion. This is a major reason for the detailed and bi-
lingual compilation in the appendix. 
52 Aspects that are most important for the upcoming analysis, such as shifts in political status due to administrative reforms and a detailed 
account on the agency’s tasks and jurisdiction, are included in section V which addresses the various impacts the Chinese political system 
has on the implementation of CZM.      22
The Chinese coastline consists of eleven administrative units - eight provinces, one autonomous 
region and two municipalities (compare figure 1). These units are from north to south: Liaoning, 
Hebei, Tianjin Municipality, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai Municipality, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Hainan.
53  These form the local level on which 
the CZM agency must be represented apart from the national level. 
 
In China, the SOA is responsible for CZM. Since its establishment over 40 years ago, it has been 
subject to major changes in terms of the reshuffling of responsibilities, the definition of major tasks, 
and sub-ordination to higher-level organs. These developments in power distribution are discussed in 
more detail in section V.1.  
The SOA is subordinated to the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) as a managed unit [80]
54 and 
consists of six departments, of which the Department of Marine Environmental Protection, the 
Department of International Cooperation, the Department of Sea Area Management and the 
Department of Science and Technology are most important for this analysis.
55  
 
Furthermore the SOA supervises at least 23 sub-units, ranging from various research and development 
institutes (e.g. for oceanography or desalination), monitoring and forecast centres to affiliated media 
organizations as well as training and other service institutions (e.g. the marine data and information 
centre) [81].
56 Among these are also three SOA branches responsible for different sea areas, i.e. the 
Northern Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They resemble regional branches.  
 
At the local level - in the coastal provinces, some Special Economic Zones and selected Open Coastal 
Cities - 15 offices or administrations exist. These local offices are either an Oceanic Administration, 
or a Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries or a compatible bureau within each provincial level 
unit. In the cities of Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo and Xiamen there are additional offices. The latter is the 
only agency holding the term of management in its name (Xiamen shi zhengfu haiyang guanli 
bangongshi). This obviously comes from the fact, that Xiamen was the first demonstration site 
established for the purpose of CZM.
57  
                                                 
53 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macao Special Administrative Region are not included into the CZM management 
structure.   
54 On behalf of the State Council the SOA is managed by the MLR. 
55 The Administrative Office and the Department of Personnel are not directly involved in management activities. 
56 For details see table in the appendix. 
57 Compare also III.2.d.   23
The more units within one province exist, the more difficult it is to assess, how these are related in 
terms of power and coordination. For instance in the province of Shandong four different units exist. 
These comprise of the provincial Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries in the province capital 
of Jinan, the Department of Marine and Aquatic Products in Qingdao, the SOA branch for the North 
China Sea (Qingdao) and the First Institute of Oceanography (Qingdao). The latter, as a research 
institute, is the only clearly subordinated unit.
58 It should be understood though that the mere counting 
of offices in a region does not necessarily reflect the region’s status and importance.  
 
d) Scientific and policy projects 
Basically, scientific research on coastal conditions and natural processes as well as the monitoring of 
indicators in order to evaluate implemented measures are perceived as most important in the CZM 
cycle [27] [10]. Therefore the existence of assessment programs and demonstration projects is likely 
to indicate the status a country is giving its CZM efforts.   
 
In China in the 1980s, scientific surveys on the coastal zone and the tidal flats introduced the 
beginning of a new era, which coincided with economic and administrative reforms. The survey on 
the coastal zone took place from 1980-1986, followed by a compatible survey on sea islands from 
1988-1993 [34] [35] [36] [37]. The year 1993 constitutes a major change from research to 
management issues. In this wake the SOA was gradually annotated to new responsibilities. For 
example, in 1989, the agency was allocated the competence for the establishment and management of 
marine nature reserves and marine protected areas. However, this does not mean, that the jurisdiction 
for marine or coastal reserves is always clear. In this example, the jurisdiction is competed by the 
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). Only the limitation of the marine reserves and 
protected areas to the SOA’s jurisdiction is delivering a possible distinction for both agencies’ 
responsibilities – whether this fact is to be valued as positive is in more detail discussed below. 
Basically, the situation is further hampered by the fact that there is no exact defining terminology in 
Chinese to settle the difference between nature reserves and protected areas.
59    
                                                 
58 Interestingly, the SOA’s official information is not clearly stating the various local departments’ status within a region, but addresses the 
hierarchical set-up among internal departments on the national level.   
59 The term generally used is huanjing baohu qu, which is not indicating the status of possible use, for example, if human settlement is 
allowed or not. According to Simard [87], also in China marine protected areas are classified into several groups. Nonetheless the Chinese 
terminology is only loosely adopting these classifications.    24
Generally, during the 1990s many international cooperation projects have been proposed on issues 
regarding the coastal zone and its management [47]. Regardless of the high number of proposals and 
project descriptions found in information on various international agents or Chinese sources on CZM 
international cooperation, the number of successfully implemented projects seems to be quite small. 
However, the quality of cooperation in fields of natural science, building the foundation for the 
already mentioned scientific surveys, is better than that regarding management issues. This is true, in 
terms of successful completion and usability of the derived data.
60  
 
Specific CZM related projects in China were started by the already mentioned Xiamen demonstration 
site for CZM. Apart from the Bohai Sea Project, which is of inter-provincial nature, and a project on 
biodiversity protection in Fangchenggang/Guangxi, Yangjiang/Guangdong and Qingangang/Hainan in 
the north of the South China Sea [66], Xiamen remains the only city with an own CZM project. 
As already indicated, many projects’ proposals were not realized or results and information were 
never distributed or widely published. Despite the low number of reliable project reports, there is 
another possible reason for less information on projects. Some projects were initiated and funded to a 
great extent by international agencies. It is not impossible, that some of the funding was misused by 
local governments for other than the proposed tasks [83]. Following a statement of Li Haiqing, deputy 
director for international cooperation at the SOA, ongoing international funding is vital in China to 
generate political will for CZM. Often these projects are locally defined and such bottom-up 
approaches have had important impact on the national opinion and policy-making. It now turns out to 
be an extensive objective of the national level to support and even generate local initiatives top-down.  
 
Not only institutional set-up, but also national and local level power distribution as well as cultural 
aspects define CZM in China. In order to evaluate the impacts of political and cultural aspects on 
decision-making processes, these features have to be specified. In the following, the unique aspects of 




                                                 
60 In various sources information on 21 projects was found since the beginning of the 1990s. Two of which were completed (proved by final 
reports), six were assumed completed (restricted time span given, no final reports found; mostly natural scientific surveys), two are ongoing 
and four are assumed ongoing (mainly management projects with only vague information accessible). For the remaining no estimation of 
status was possible.   25
IV) The Chinese political system 
Most decisive power structures in Chinese politics derive from the political system and the political 
culture. These factors can be divided into formal aspects of the institutional set-up and informal 
aspects, such as unique cultural characteristics.  
 
IV.1) Informal power aspects – cultural features 
The main cultural aspect of Chinese politics is found in relation-networks, the so-called guanxi. 
Politically, these are patronage relations; a political career is only possible with protection of an elder 
official. Socially, guanxi denote many kinds of personal and social networks. For instance, networks 
of former fellow students (compatible to alumni in parts of the Western world) build an education-
based guanxi. Social or personal groups can, among others, range from the army, interest groups, 
family or clan. Every guanxi-relation is based on mutual benefit.  
Most scientists working on this field of informal power aspects, emphasize that guanxi often generate 
a corrupt environment. This way they clearly obstruct the effectiveness of the state.
61 On the other 
hand, in a case of deterioration of state structures or functions (e.g. due to war or the economic 
collapse of a system), guanxi can uphold some of the inevitable functions by exchanging the state 
structures with social network structures.  
It should also be mentioned, that guanxi are not entirely unique to the Chinese society, but in China 
they clearly take up a more important position, than e.g. in Europe. This way, rather traditional 
notions become supported by a political system generating such networks.
62   
 
IV.2) Formal power aspects  
a) Party - state relations 
The formal aspects are typical for a Leninist state structure. These are the lack of separation of powers 
– legislative, judicative and executive are all held by one agent, in China this is the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). This way, also the lack of distinction between the party and the government 
is reflected. The situation is still held up by the Nomenclature system. Despite some reforms, every 
leading administrative and political official is still appointed by one level above in the structural 
                                                 
61 The complexity of government generated network systems (such as the Nomenclature system to be explained further down) and their 
intermingling with society-based systems – as the guanxi-system – leads to a variety of terms used. Thus corruption becomes largely related 
to political patronage-networks and general rent-seeking activities [84] [85], whereas in administrative studies corruption and reciprocity 
both become features of ineffectiveness and are described as ‘social norms’ [86]. Further reading on guanxi is provided by Gold et al. [87]. 
62 For information on political patronage relation-networks see Heilmann [88].   26
hierarchy.
63 Generally, the authority in such a political system is organized in a strict hierarchy and 
has influence on every level of government activity.
64    
 
b) Governmental - institutional power potential 
Additionally to this, a similarly parallel system of institutions exists. In order to explain constraints in 
decision-making processes regarding environmental policy, Lieberthal [93] [94] illustrates the 
(im)balance of vertical and horizontal power structures; this scheme is also called the kuai-tiao-system. 
Most important is that ministries hold the same power position as local governments. This way the 
ministries are not in a position to give direct orders to the local level, unless they take the ‘detour’ of 
their own institutional branches on the various governmental levels. As these institutional branches 
are situated slightly lower than the local government of the same level, a small bias exists in favour of 
the local power. 
In figure 3 Lieberthal’s concept was adopted for agencies of the Ministry of Land and Resources in 
Shanghai.
65 Whereas the vertical tiao-relations still show a one-directional power distribution, to be 
interpreted mostly as binding orders, the horizontal kuai-relation is much more open to negotiation and 
therefore can be considered effective in both directions. Consequently, the power of institutions on the 
local level is very much depending on power relation of the local government to the centre or its 
independence from it. The more own political power a local government has, e.g. because of 
successful economic decentralization, the more the tiao-relation is exercised by the institutional 
influence of the centre. This way tiao-relations less determine power relations than kuai-relations do. 
In turn, a weak local government still more depends on tiao-relations and institutional influence is 
guaranteed at the local kuai-level.  
 
c) Central - local power distribution and administrative reforms 
The Chinese governmental organization is divided into central, provincial, prefecture, county and 
township levels. However, even more modes of division exist, such as urban/rural and also 
direct/indirect control measures
66  are important. The provincial level (shengji) encompasses all 
                                                 
63 On the Nomenclature system compare Gottwald/Kirchberger [84], Heilmann/Kirchberger [89], Zhao [90] and Huai [91]. 
64 The CCP party bureau is not only controlling its own committees on each level, but also takes significant influence onto the Military 
Commission, the State Council – as the highest organ of government in China – and the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s 
parliament. Compare Heilmann [92].   
65 Referring to Lieberthal’s chart 2 [93].  
66 Prefecture-level (diji) cities – inserted between the provincial and county levels during the administrative reform period– as well as sub-
provincial cities with own economic and administrative power are reflecting the variety of different power levels created by administrative   27
provinces, municipalities directly under the State Council (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing) 
and autonomous regions (Nei Menggu = Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Xizang = Tibet and 
Guangxi). The Hong Kong SAR (Special Administrative Region; tebie xingzhengqu) and the Macao 
SAR are not included in this system of centralized control.
67  
Power distribution within the administrative set-up in China is either focussed on the central-local 
relations, which mostly carry a hierarchical dimension, or the relation between local levels, which 
increasingly reflect a situation of competition. Since the economic and administrative reforms of 1979 
the central power has been extensively transferred to the local level. Recent changes in the kuai-tiao-
relations have already reflected a major transfer. For the institutional analysis basic information on 
changes in the administrative organization and specific changes in CZM organisation due to the 
administrative reforms in China are vital. This provides for an estimation of local power distribution.
68  
 
V) Impacts of the Chinese political system 
V.1) CZM and administrative reforms 
For the administrative context the reforms were started slightly after their economic counterparts.   
1982 generally counts as the year of the first of four major structural reforms of the State Council 
(guowuyuan jigou gaige), that were undertaken in 1988, 1993 and 1998.
69  Within the context of 
coastal zone management significant changes of responsible and affiliated agencies have taken place, 
which will be described in the following. Regarding the estimation of political power it should be 




The leading agency for coastal zone management is the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), which 
was formerly (in translation) named National Bureau of Oceanography. Until 1993 its status was 
directly under the State Council (figure 4). This was the status giving the agency the most possible 
                                                                                                                                                          
status. Sub-provincial cities along the coast are: Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Hangzhou (located between Shanghai and Ningbo), Xiamen, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen. 
67 After their return under Chinese sovereignty – 1997 and 1999 respectively – these two territories fell under the arrangement of so-called 
‘one country, two systems’ and still have a position of extended domestic autonomy based on international contracts. Compare Heilmann [1, 
p. 120]. 
68 Local power is equally depending on the administrative status a city has. In this analysis the municipality of Shanghai and the city of 
Xiamen with a status of a special economic zone both have significant local power, but yet with different central-level support.  
69 Since then only minor changes have taken place in 2001 [95].
  There are plans for even further reforms – especially in the administration 
set-up of economic state organs – beginning in 2003. These reforms are probably not affecting CZM agencies. Compare CHINA aktuell [96]. 
In general, the structural reforms of the administration aimed at a reduction of government agencies as well as their personnel and making the 
set-up more efficient.   
70 The term ‘commission’ is only still used out of traditional motives and will be subject to gradual abolishment. Compare Heilmann [97] 
referring to an interview with Gu Jiaqi, in: Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong, 11.3.1998.   28
independence and administrative strength. At the same time the agencies responsibilities had been 
already extended from predominantly research to coastal zone management activities. For example in 
1989 it was given the responsibility over the establishment, administration and management of Marine 
Protected Areas and Marine Nature Reserves.
71   In 1993 the SOA became incorporated into the 
Commission of Science and Technology [41, p.110] [98] [99] [100] [101]
72.
  This way it experienced 
an administrative downgrading, while its responsibilities grew, i.e. one year later in Xiamen the first 
demonstration site was being established under the co-operation of SOA and international groups such 
as GEF, UNDP and IMO.  
 
In 1998 another re-organization of the administrative structure and responsibilities took place. Thus, 
during the fourth administrative reform, the SOA was incorporated into the newly established 
Ministry of Land and Resources [41]
 .
73 This time the re-organization reflected a slight upgrading, as 
the SOA now became compatible to a ‘managed unit’ of the Ministry of Land and Resources, instead 
of being completely controlled by it or the Commission of Science and Technology respectively. An 
important difference is that the MLR is not involved in the SOA’s finances.
  
 
At the same time the Commission of Science and Technology was turned into a ministry without a 
major change of responsibility. It is still marginally important to the work of the SOA as this ministry 
is initiating and supervising research also in marine areas.
74  Of comparable importance is the 
cooperation with the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in terms of natural 
protection areas in the coastal zone that are not managed by the SOA or by the National Bureau of 
Forestry (that is responsible for e.g. mangroves).
75 Another important agent in the coastal zone is the 
                                                 
71 Zhang [34] refers to the year 1988. Many Marine Nature Reserves were established in the beginning of the 1990s.   
72 The incorporation was decided upon by the State Council on 19 April 1993 (8. NPC). A final list of administrative changes published in 
the Renmin Ribao on 11 and 13 Juli 1993 clearly indicates that the guojia haiyang ju was now placed under the Commission for Science and 
Technology (referring to Xinhua, 11 July 1993 and Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 July 1993 and Renmin Ribao 13 July 1993 cited after 
[100] [101]). For the status of governmental agencies before these changes please refer to: Zhongguo zhengfu jigou ji guanyuan minglu 
1989/1990, Hongkong 1990 and Zhongyang guojia jiguan suoshu shiye danwei daquan, Beijing 1992 and China Directory, Tokyo 1992 
(cited after [98] [99]). 
73 The major reform of 1998 was the most radical so far. Five ‘super-ministries’ were established either through upgrading in status and 
extension of responsibilities - these are the State Commission for Economy and Trade, the Ministry for Labour and Social Security, and the 
State Commission of Defence for Science, Technology and Industry - or the merging of existing ministries and other organs, administrations 
and institutions directly under the State Council (Ministry for Information Industry and Ministry for Land and Resources). Particularly the 
merged ministries gained significant power while embracing departments of different economic sectors. This is also the reason for 
associating them with extensive economic regulating power [97].
   
74 In this context also compare the SOA set-up with its own Department of Science and Technology in the appendix. 
75 The National Bureau of Forestry derived from the Ministry of Forestry, contains a Department of Wildlife Protection, and was uncoupled 
of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1982.   29
Ministry of Agriculture with its Department of Fishery and therefore significant regional interest in 
the coastal zone as part of resource allocation.
76  
 
Since 1998 the objectives of the SOA have become more numerous and its responsibilities now 
extend to management and institutional coordination. However, this can be interpreted on three levels. 
First, the internal responsibilities encompass the management of all institutions and offices involved - 
ranging from planning and management of the seas to various institutes of oceanography and other 
research units as far as media agencies (e.g. the journals of China Ocean Press in Beijing). Secondly, 
the external responsibilities are an attempt to coordinate all institutions involved in coastal zone 
management, which would be the task of SOA’s Department of Sea Area Management. Thirdly, it 




The conditions of the first version can be verified by a look into media presentations of the SOA [51]. 
In this case the SOA’s leading responsibility is undisputed. This is also true for the third option of 
international cooperation, which is organized directly by the SOA.  
However, the role the SOA plays in the coordination of various governmental agencies involved in 
CZM remains unclear. In the following the SOA’s perception of its objectives will be discussed. 
Furthermore the cooperation with other agencies for some of these tasks will be clarified and 
overlapping responsibilities illustrated and evaluated.  
 
V.2) CZM issues (SOA) 
The SOA itself emphasizes its objectives in safeguarding marine rights and interests in managing the 
sea area use, co-ordinating the utilization of and development of marine resources, protecting the 
marine environment, and mitigating natural disasters. Apart from sea area use this does not indicate an 
overall coordination objective for CZM. The rather fuzzy expression of marine rights and interests 
includes policy, law and regulation formulation, but also emphasizes the protection of Chinese 
sovereignty in the oceans. Functional zoning of the marine area is largely considered a means of CZM, 
however, in China the stress is put on ocean development plans, marine industry and marginally on 
marine protection areas  [33] [34] [37] [51] [102].  
                                                 
76 The Ministry of Agriculture had been renamed and restructured until 1988. 
77 As every governmental institution in China the SOA, too, has an office for international relations.    30
 
a) Jurisdiction overlap                               
The SOA [102] admits the need to co-operate with certain other governmental agencies in order to 
pursue its tasks. Explicitly mentioned are: 
- the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST; pre-1998 it was ranked a commission) [103] 
- the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) [104] 
- the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR; by whom the SOA is managed) [105] 
- the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA; former NEPA) [106] 
- the National Bureau of Forestry (NBF) [107] 
- the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) with its Fishery Department [108] 
 
As these agencies cover either scientific, zonation-related, or environment and resource oriented 
issues a significant overlapping of functions is likely. In order to investigate the nature and contents of 
these overlaps, they should be categorized according to their co-operation status. In figure 5 the 
official SOA tasks according to the SOA’s programme are put into a matrix with CZM related 
agencies. The left section encompasses the agencies the SOA says to have co-operation with, the right 
(italic) section contains selected agencies likely to be involved in CZM. Here the following organs are 
included: the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) [109], the Ministry of Construction (MOC) [110], 
the National Tourism Administration (NTA) [111], the Economic and Trade Commission (ETC) [112], 
the Development Planning Commission (DPC) [113], and the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) 
[114] subordinated to the Ministry of Communication 
 [115]. There are three categories illustrating 
relation conditions, ranging from (1) clear jurisdictional overlap
78, to (2) assumed co-operation, and 
(3) potential conflicts in the coastal zone.  
 
Most of the clear overlaps occur with powerful agencies like the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Land and Resources, which the SOA is subordinated to. The scientific institutions are 
more likely to co-operate with the SOA. With organs like the National Bureau of Forestry and the 
State Environmental Protection Agency only a few formal overlaps occur. For the latter the 
institutions’ internal power structures will be most important in defining which institution is able to 
                                                 
78 These are proved overlaps, either taken from the agencies’ programmes (to be found on Chinese and partly also English website 
presentations of the agencies; see reference section) or from case studies illustrating these; e.g. Buen [41]. Additional information on 
ministries and commissions can be gained at www.chinaonline.com.    31
hold the jurisdiction. Hence, personnel structure and the leading officials’ commitment will be 
decisive.  
 
Potential conflicts are most likely to occur with agencies the SOA is not explicitly claiming to 
undertake co-operation with. It should be kept in mind, however, that some of the italic section 
agencies are established governmental organs, partly defending growing economic interests within the 
coastal zone and are to be considered as comparably powerful.  
 
The SOA’s objective of responsibility over marine resources is one of the most disputed. Although the 
SOA is emphasising to be in charge of the planning process, also the terms of co-ordination of 
utilization of the resources is explicitly mentioned in some SOA publications. However, the Ministry 
of Land and Resources also explicitly claims jurisdiction over all activities affiliated with marine 
resource exploitation (including offshore oil and gas as well as mineral resources). In the most 
positive constellation, this would leave a scientific, but not managerial, planning task for the SOA. A 
similar situation occurs for the fisheries and aquaculture resources. These are taken care of by the 
Fishery Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, a condition agreed to by the SOA. In respect of 
marine resources this does not leave much scope for marine resource activities by the SOA. As all 
affected ministries claim responsibility in their programmes, a clear overlap of jurisdiction can be 
detected. 
 
Wherever an overlap is not clearly detectable within the ministries’ programmes, co-operation should 
be assumed. Though this does not mean, that co-operation is also achieved in practice. Within the 
context of environmental protection and marine zoning, e.g. a co-operation with the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) is most likely. Nonetheless, jurisdictional overlap is 
also likely, as the SOA is responsible for the marine zoning and hence every protection area within 
this zone. SEPA in return is responsible for land-based protected areas. All reserves established within 
the transition zone between marine and terrestrial would be theoretically disputed. It seems, that in 
practice also protected areas or reserves situated in the coastal zone are being managed to high degree 
by the SOA, at least if they have a national, provincial or even international status, such as Ramsar   32
sites
79. Still unclear is, for instance, the jurisdiction over mangrove protected areas. On a local scale 
they are mainly managed by the National Bureau of Forestry, and as Ramsar sites they are included 
into the SOA management system. It is almost impossible to judge, whether there is still a co-
operation taking place after a change in status. But as marine zoning is also undertaken on a smaller 
than provincial scale at least here co-operation may be assumed. 
 
Most strikingly the Maritime Safety Administration is not mentioned by the SOA as a potential co-
operating partner. As this agency is responsible for marine transport especially within the subject of 
disaster mitigation jurisdictional overlap exists [41]. The relations of the other agencies in the italic 
section of figure 5 to the SOA have potential conflict. An example is the Ministry of Construction, 
which is responsible for the building of major construction projects within the coastal zone. There are 
some negative impacts construction projects may have on the marine ecosystem, e.g. changing of 
marine currents and thus influence on biodiversity and possible degradation of resources and 
economic loss. This holds a significant conflict potential between the SOA and the MOC.  
Looking at the jurisdictional overlaps it becomes clear, that the emphasis of the SOA’s jurisdiction on 
the marine zone, while leaving the land-based jurisdiction to other agencies, does not mitigate the 
problems of the management in the coastal zone. Therefore, all jurisdiction needs to be defined much 
clearer and in more detail. The creation of two separate zones, instead of one coastal zone reflecting 
the transitional nature of the area [39, p.10], does not seem reasonable.   
 
Preceding, China’s national level CZM policy and the structural conditions for implementing this 
policy on institutional level have been discussed. In the following chapter the focus is on the structural 
set-up of local CZM approaches in China. These are likewise affected by political and social 
conditions in China. The strength of impact may differ at the local level due to reasons of local power 
distribution and CZM issues defined. 
 
VI) Local CZM approaches in China   
In the following the organisational structure of the CZM approach of the city of Xiamen, which has 
been successfully applied, will be compared to the structure of a proposed CZM approach for 
Shanghai. Further it will be evaluated, if the Xiamen approach would be locally applicable for the 
                                                 
79 Ramsar denotes the Convention on Wetlands in Ramsar, Iran 1971. Ramsar sites fulfil the criteria for wetlands of international importance. 
The organization assists governments with guidelines for development and conservation of the sites [116].    33
Shanghai municipality taking the structural organisation of the Xiamen approach and the different 
political condition in Shanghai into account. Finally it should be assessed if it could be an option for a 
national approach.  
 
VI.1) Shanghai’s current CZM structure 
At the moment CZM in Shanghai is still being carried out on a sectoral basis. The SOA has the formal 
leadership. Nonetheless, no CZM commission exists, and co-ordination of affected sectors is loosely 
organized by the SOA, but not formally adopted
80. Due to Shanghai’s enormous economic power 
gained mainly during the past decade, the economic sectors are very powerful. In terms of the kuai-
tiao-system this strengthens the local government and the institutional SOA relation is becoming the 
most important central level impact. This is calling for a very strong SOA in order to be able to 
implement national SOA directives. The local government is also involved into a strong guanxi-
relation with the economic sector. In contrast, the input by the independent scientific community (i.e. 
academics working at universities rather than being employed by the SOA) is left scattered and is 
comparably negligible
81. Partly due to poor coordination a weak implementation of CZM policies is 
expected. Additionally, political will is left as the only possible generating factor for CZM.  
 
VI.2) Shanghai’s proposed CZM structure 
Shi et al. [40] published a proposed CZM structure for Shanghai. As illustrated in figure 6 it is a 
strictly hierarchical set-up, indicated by the pyramid form of organization. The SOA is situated on top, 
indicating formal power. A so-called management organization, formed by the SOA with early input 
by the local government, but obviously no responsibility taken by the government, is supervising a 
support group (administrative input), an executive group (stakeholder input) and an advisory group 
(scientific input). Remarkably, these three groups only partly interact with each other: the support 
group and the advisory group do not. The executive group is in charge of implementing various 
projects, activities and measures within CZM policy.  
Problematic is, that the decisions on CZM contents are made before stakeholders are engaged. This is 
also excluding the possibility of objectifying the economies’ financial powers for certain relevant 
issues. For instance, within the context of sea-level rise, the economic sector is going to loose, and 
                                                 
80 Information gathered during a personal interview on the 18 September 2002 with Yang Kailiang, director of the Shanghai Marine 
Department, Integrative Section.  
81 Information gained through personal communication with anonymous scientists.    34
would probably be open to support related CZM measures and co-operate with the SOA in case of 
possible early participation. Also the scientific input happens far too late to be considered an 
important intervention.  
 
Regarding the issues chosen for CZM in Shanghai, the SOA is in the position to steer its interests. 
Usually, it can be expected that pressing issues will be put on top of the agenda, but in the case of the 
SOA solely deciding it may favour marine issues (rather than multi-use conflicts for example). Due to 
a double impact by the local government (and its administration) at both stages - decision-making and 
implementing - the proposed issues will have to be generated by the local political level. Like in the 
current CZM structure, this again, makes the organization dependent on political will. That is, the 
issues being steered by the central level via the SOA and the implementation undertaken by the local 
government with its strong guanxi to the economic sector. Although the structure is very hierarchical, 
formal and informal power distribution on the local level result in a double impact of the local 
government, while the responsibility lies with the SOA. This makes a successful implementation of 
the proposed CZM approach questionable.  
 
VI.3) Xiamen’s CZM structure 
This structure has been successfully implemented in Xiamen for a couple of years now and illustrates 
the CZM organization of the first demonstration site for CZM in China (figure 7). The effort was 
supported in 1994 by international organizations
82. In contrast to the proposed structure for Shanghai, 
Xiamen’s CZM set-up relies on a system of early professional participation and a structure which is 
problem-oriented (such the pyramid form stands on its head now). Main planning and implementing 
organ is an executive committee closely engaged with the local government. The responsibility lies 
with the mayor of the city, who is also supervising the Executive Committee.
83 The input of the local 
government and the SOA into the Executive Committee can be considered equal.  
 
Furthermore the administration as well as the economic stakeholders (in co-operation with a Science 
and Technology Commission that takes care of technical questions) has a particularly early input into 
                                                 
82 These are the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). 
83 Information was partly gained at the PEMSEA workshop on CZM in Xiamen 20-23 September 2002. The Xiamen ICZM approach as 
described here has been published by Chua et al. [11]. A more recent publication by McCleave et al. [26] informs that the structure has been 
consolidated in 1999, when the Xiamen demonstration project formally ended.    35
the planning process. The Science and Technology Commission also has a practical input into the 
implementing stage. The close interaction of the two groups that actively implement the policies – the 
Administrative Unit and the Expert Group – is considered very positive. Such is an early scientific 
input into the planning stage via a guanxi-input of the expert group
84  directly into the local 
government that supervises the Executive Committee.  
 
VI.4) Alternatives 
a) Alternative 1: Application of the Xiamen structure to the situation in Shanghai 
A positive aspect of the Xiamen structure is the early and double input of the Expert Group in both 
development stages. However, the first (and unofficial) input is characterized by guanxi-relation not 
as strong in Shanghai as in Xiamen (if existing at all). The factor, that the local government would be 
responsible for CZM implementation, is to be considered as positive. 
 
Nonetheless, also the Xiamen approach can only be generated with significant political will and is 
depending to a high degree on local initiative. This situation can become problematic with disputed 
issues. Generally, in Shanghai the danger of the economic lobby becoming too powerful in this 
structure is reducing the possibility of a successful adoption of the Xiamen structure to Shanghai. This 
is the more true as presumably absent scientific guanxi and a comparably weak SOA have to be 
considered. Only a very strong SOA and an early participation of the scientific community could 
possibly relativize an established economic lobby such as Shanghai’s. 
 
b) Alternative 2: Possible modification of the Xiamen CZM structure 
In order to transform the Xiamen structure into a universally applicable approach, at least along the 
Chinese coast, several modifications are necessary. As can be seen in figure 8 the Xiamen CZM 
structure would gain more strength with a balanced initial input of the local level represented by the 
local government, the central and local institutional level represented by the SOA and the scientific 
component represented by the Expert Group. The danger of e.g. the economic sector becoming too 
powerful and the constraint of varying local power structures in different cities could be lessened by 
                                                 
84 A guanxi-relation is not included in official illustrations. My intention, though, is to incorporate informal power structures into my 
explanations. Through my participation at a PEMSEA workshop on CZM in Xiamen 20-23 September 2002, I became knowledge of this 
good co-operation between the local government and the scientific community, which to a high degree determines the success of CZM in 
Xiamen. Chua et al. [11] describes a one way input of the municipal government into the expert group, whereas McCleave et al. [26, figure 4, 
p. 68] already shows a mutual impact between the Marine Management and Coordinating Committee and the Marine Expert Group and so 
indicates the high importance of  the latter to the CZM set-up in Xiamen.   36
this homogeneous and early impact of the institutional administration in form of the SOA (which 
stands in contrast to the local administration that is included this way in the Xiamen structure), the 
local government and a group of independent experts.  
 
Of course, a generally applicable structure should not include informal relations, but it should be able 
to compensate such factors, if necessary, in order to be able to guarantee a working structure. The 
triple input on top of the structure should be able to balance guanxi between the local government and 
the economic sector through providing two agencies with strong environmental interests. This way, in 
most situations, a political balance of the kuai- and the tiao-relations can be achieved, as the local 
government and the SOA have an equal initial input.  
 
In the future, also public participation should be actively included in the CZM structures; even if this 
can only happen by and by. Until now and in harmony with the national and local level formulation 
public participation has been theoretically reduced to education and awareness raising. However, in 
practice there are, for instance in Xiamen [26], local initiatives organized.
 These are rather informative 
actions though. Generally participation - also in Xiamen – means stakeholders are being informed but 
not asked to contribute to the decision or the public may feedback to the government their opinion and 
perception of certain measures, but there is no guarantee that this will lead to any input into the 
decision other than that the government knows that it sometimes acts contrary to the public’s concerns. 
Although this may sound not unlike some programs in the rest of the world, the Chinese in general 
have considerably less possibilities to participate politically, and therefore a change would have to 
happen in smaller steps than elsewhere. However, within the Chinese present political condition the 
participation as practiced in Xiamen represents a clear difference to former times. One may say it with 
the words of McCleave et al. “community-based management […] does not exist yet in China and is 
not feasible, for various economic, political and educational reasons” [26, p. 70/71].   
 
VII) Conclusion – Is Chinese CZM constrained by structural impacts? 
The concept of integrated CZM is very broadly defined in order to be applicable to most regions and 
countries. Due to China’s political system and socio-economic situation, determining factors of CZM 
policy and implementing structures need to be redefined according to the political reality. Thus the   37
Chinese notion of CZM for instance largely ignores public participation as an important factor of 
CZM and redefines its status within the whole structure.  
 
Even with an own national concept, the institutional organization of the implementing agency has an 
important impact on the way decisions are made and programmes are implemented. The co-ordination 
of affected agencies is a big challenge, not only for China, but a clearly defined jurisdiction seems to 
be necessary. Overlapping responsibilities often obstruct development and therefore need a better 
solution.  
Generally, the SOA’s responsibilities should be extended towards the coastal zone, instead of the 
marine area only. As the analysis of the SOA’s jurisdiction has shown a mere eradication of the 
overlaps within the marine zone will not mitigate the problem of overlapping jurisdiction within the 
coastal zone. So far only one part of the SOA’s tasks extends to the coastal zone.
85 The clarification of 
SOA’s jurisdiction is the objective of the legislation. An early formulation of a CZM act can be a 
possible means to strengthen the SOA’s power. Another possibility is a consistent status upgrading of 
the agency by the central government. This would mean more institutional power for the SOA. 
Parallel to more clarity in responsibilities this yields good options for subsequent implementation.  
 
There are numerous approaches of CZM and the WCC 1993 was the first attempt to produce general 
guidelines for all countries that wished to follow the (I)CZM concept in order to control problems and 
negative impacts in the coastal zone and make a sustainable development there possible. With the 
time many local projects emerged and China contributed to this with the Xiamen development project. 
As the comparison of various set-ups has illustrated even a successful local CZM structure cannot be 
implemented nationwide without significant modification and careful evaluation of involved power 
structures. While it is generally accepted that the contents of each project have to be modified to the 
local conditions found, i.e. biological, geographic or even demographic, the political perspective had 
been neglected so far. Through emphasising the structure of CZM organisation and its position as 
embedded in a country’s political system, this study shows that a concept’s content and organizational 
structure are likewise decisive of its successful implementation. Since China has formulated no 
national guidelines for ICZM yet, this theoretically leaves the decision and the formulation of ICZM-
structures to the local level. This study contributes to the ICZM discourse in China by drawing an 
                                                 
85 According to the self-presentation of the agency these are objectives related to functional zoning. The relevant department is the Sea Area 
Management Department [67] [68]. Compare www.soa.gov.cn/jigou/1/zhize.htm.   38
elementary structure of a conceptual organisational set-up that is likely to be suitable for most 
localities in China. 
 
Apparently, all CZM structures must be considered very carefully for all kinds of issues and different 
local interests involved. In addition, the question whether Chinese CZM functions is still very difficult 
to answer. China came up with its own structural approach and a certain bias in the direction of the 
marine sector. Research on China to a large part depends on background knowledge, official 
information and personal contacts. Mostly it is restricted by controlled media coverage and 
bureaucracy. Therefore it is still very difficult to gain information on examples of planned and 
implemented projects or reaction to unexpected development or disasters that could be used to 
determine the success of CZM and the decision-making processes involved. Nevertheless there is a 
need for extended research with such case studies to assess the effectiveness of Chinese CZM, e.g. on 
prevention of loss due to storm surges or the management of conflicts in the coastal zone, to fill in the 
theoretical framework.  
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Figure 1: Administrative map of China’s coast with Open Coastal Cities and economic regions 
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Figure 2: CZM development stages (adapted from Winsemius [29], figures 1 and 2) 
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Figure 4: SOA structural development 
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 CZM rights and 
 laws      X   X            X   O             
 Marine  
 resources   X   X   O      O   O   A   A   A      O   O 
 Marine 
 environmental  
 protection   X   X   O   X   O   O   X   A   A   O   A   O 
 Disaster  
 mitigation   O      X      O   O   X            O   O 
 Marine zoning   X   X   O   O      O   X   O   O   O   A    
 Coastal zoning   X   X   X   X   O   O   X   X   X   X   X   O 
 
(X=jurisdictional overlap; O=co-operation; A=potential conflict) 
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Figure 8: Modified ICZM structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 